Yesterday I expressed my support of the war…in theory. The actual handling of the war is another story. It has turned into a messy affair, been bungled at every step of the way and now exists as quite another beast.
Believe me when I tell you that I take what the media says with a grain of salt. The bottom line is that they have no real sense of the situation on the ground in Iraq. They can’t possibly know what is going on as they are too far removed. Sure they have embedded correspondents, but these reporters are privileged to security measures beyond the average soldier (and obviously far beyond the average citizen). The same can be said of politicians living 6,000 miles from the combat zone. Neither Bush and his staff nor the Democrat majority can have any real tangible sense of what is going on as they are just as removed as the media.
So who do we turn to for accurate war assessments? Clearly the commanders that are physically in Iraq leading the ground effort. And what are these men saying? Current Commander Gen. David Petraeus has said “military action is necessary to help improve security…but it is not sufficient.” He is referring to the need for diplomacy, but Bush, until recently, has stubbornly refused to deal with two of the most important players, Iran and Syria. Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who led the coalition forces from 2005 to 2006, has stated that the Iraqi insurgency has the support of millions of Sunnis who reject a US installed government. This contradicts assessments made by Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney (who believed the insurgency consisted solely of Saddam loyalists and foreign Jihadists). Now retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey told the Pentagon in a private report that the “war is lost,” and that the US military would be unable to stop the growing violence claiming 1,000 Iraqi civilians a month.
Taking into account the tight-lipped nature of the military, this level of disclosure paints an ominous picture, particularly after Rumsfeld’s efforts to keep top military officials quiet. Consider the example of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who admitted that he felt hundreds of thousands of troops would be need to secure Iraq. Rumsfeld’s offices called this estimate “wildly off the mark” before leaking word of Shinseki’s replacement 15 months before he was set to retire, both embarrassing and neutralizing him.
So what went wrong? In my (un-authoritative) assessment it boils down to two things. First, the US government and intelligence community did not, and have yet to, grasp the reality of the situation they walked into. Second, it has been suggested that the region was on the brink of crumbling anyway.
First things first. The architects of the war, bottom line, were working with incomplete blueprints. They failed to grasp the depth or nature of pre-existing conflicts, the character of the Iraqi people, and the vein of anti-Americanism that permeates the region. The Pentagon didn’t have a plan in place to secure and rebuild a country shattered by a war following years of oppression. American military commanders initially wanted 100,000 additional troops to aide in this effort. These troops were never provided. Central Command proposed a force of 380,000 to attack and occupy Iraq. Rumsfeld decided on 40,000. They finally compromised at 250,000, but most of these troops were either delayed or never sent as a result of Rumsfeld’s micromanagement.
The theory was that the war would be over and most of the troops could be brought home once Saddam was ousted. The CIA predicted that the Iraqi Army would turn against Saddam and that pro-American Iraqis would pick up the pieces. This never happened. We went in thinking that we would be welcomed by all of Iraq as liberators. True, some saw US troops that way, but it seems like the majority saw it as an unwanted foreign occupation and went to work defending their country. Others saw it as an opportunity to reignite age old sectarian conflicts and win influence for their respective sects. Others greedily saw it as an opportunity to take advantage of a power vacuum. And those who remain live with the consequences.
In addition to being ill-prepared when we invaded Iraq, we failed to recognize the delicate balance which the stability of Iraq was resting on before we became involved, which brings us to the second reason we find ourselves in a disaster area.
Ali Allawi, a man who knows what he is talking about (he has served as Minister of Defense and Minister of Finance since Saddam’s capture), recently published a memoir titled “The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace.” While Allawi certainly questions the execution of the war, he asserts that Iraq was on the brink of implosion well before American troops arrived.
When the Coalition arrived in Baghdad on 9 April, 2003, it found a fractured and brutalized society, presided over by a fearful, heavily armed minority. The post-9/11 jihadi culture that was subsequently to plague Iraq was just beginning to take root. The institutions of the state were moribund; the state exhausted. The ideology that had held Ba'athist rule together had decayed beyond repair.
The problem stemmed from the precarious balance between the majority Shiites and the Saddam controlled Sunni dictatorship. By controlling the media, educational system and economy Saddam was able to eradicate any sense of Shiite identity. When the mass killings started following the Gulf War, all hope was lost for many Shiites.
In the years between the Gulf War and the invasion Iraq was plagued by unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and the exodus of intellectuals. Saddam responded with theocratic rhetoric, calls for jihad, and “morals” campaigns. America was blamed by many for the plight of the country (perhaps rightfully so). To the Shiites, America was the country that allowed Saddam to stay in power and watched as he slaughtered their people. To Sunnis and Shiites alike, America was the country that imposed harsh sanctions which hurt the average citizen far more than the government.
Simply put, Iraq was a breeding ground for radicalism, hate, fear, and violence, and in large part America was to blame. The chaos in Iraq was inevitable, we just accelerated the process by creating a power vacuum.
This by no means clears America. The lack of planning, leadership and direction in the rebuilding effort is inexcusable, and we have a long ways to go in correcting those mistakes.
The problem is that both Republicans and Democrats need to quit playing politick and pull their heads out of their asses. Republicans need to understand the principle that violence begets violence. It will be impossible to beat Iraq into submission with force. The insurgency is fighting with the conviction that they are defending their faith and their country. That combination of beliefs will simply never back down, never quit, never lose. Diplomacy will be needed to settle disputes and broker agreements, and this may mean working with those we regard as enemies.
Democrats need to understand that a pullout date is not the answer, and to attach one to a war funding bill is political posturing at its worst. If they thought about it logically they would see what a terrible idea it is just like the Republicans. Bush actually had a good argument in his speech after he vetoed the bill when he pointed out that setting a pullout date simply tells violent radicals when America will be gone. All they have to do is gather strength and wait. Democrats also need to understand that leaving now would mean abandoning all of those average citizens, leaving their fates in the hands of brutal militants.
So is a troop surge the answer? I think it depends on the purpose of the troop surge. If we’re thinking we can send more soldiers to beat down the insurgency, in my opinion we’re dead wrong. If the troops go with the intention of aiding the rebuilding effort, training Iraqi troops and making the country safer for its citizens, then I think it might be the right play.
And I’m spent. I’ve given all I have on the war in Iraq, and perhaps more (definitely more than anyone wanted to know). “A (Very) Brief History of the Middle East” has drawn to a close.
It seems almost anticlimactic. Should there be a ceremony, should taps be played, should there be some grand gesture symbolizing the end of an epoch? No. I wash my hands of the whole messy affair and thank you for joining me in this effort to better understand the world around us.
Thanks for reading.
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